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This study argues that parents have a desire for dividing equally between their children, and 
that this motive applies to transfers of gifts inter vivos. We suggest that the equal division 
motive competes with traditional altruism: support to the child or the children with greatest 
needs. When parents are drawn between these two ambitions, the degree of income 
compensation should be stronger in one-child families and we expect the altruism motive to 
dominate the equal division desire at low levels of recipients’ income. We find support for 
both these hypotheses, when analysing Norwegian data for inter vivos transfers behaviour. 
The data include information about stated attitudes towards transfers among the parents, 
which also support the equal division motive. 
JEL Code: D64, D91, H21. 












Thor O. Thoresen 
Statistics Norway 
Research Department 








November 4, 2008 
We would like to thank Barry Johnson, Alexander Cappelen and seminar participants at 
Skatteforum (Hankø, Norway, 2005), IARIW (Joensuu, Finland, 2006), and micro-
econometric seminars at the University of Melbourne (May, 2007) and Statistics Norway for 
inspiring comments and suggestions. Our appreciation also to Åsmund Langsether and Lars 
Guldbrandsen at NOVA for generously providing the data. 1 Introduction
The altruism model (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1979) suggests
that parents compensate their children and divide transfers unequally between
children whose needs are di⁄erent. However, empirical analyses ￿nd weak support
for the predictions of the altruism model, as parents often transfer equal amounts
to their children. How should one interpret this ￿nding? One would reasonably
assume that most parents are essentially altruistic towards their children in the
sense that they care about their children￿ s welfare and consumption possibilities.
However, it is also reasonable to assume that they would like to treat their children
equally. If parents￿have preferences for equal sharing, they will have to weigh their
altruism against a desire for equal divisions.
The equal division question has received attention in the literature on intergen-
erational transfers; see for instance Menchik (1988), Wilhelm (1996), Stark (1998),
Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000), and Bernheim and Severinov (2003). A number of
papers discuss intergenerational linkages through inter vivos giving behaviour (as
in the present paper) instead of addressing information on bequests, see Altonji et
al. (1997) and Poterba (2001). The growing awareness of parents￿transfer behav-
iour before death appears to have emerged because recent ￿ndings, for instance
from the U.S., suggest a majority of parents divide their estates equally between
children at death, while inter vivos gift behaviour to a larger extent results from
parents￿response to characteristics of children (Dunn and Phillips, 1997; McGarry,
1999). This has prompted theories focusing on heterogeneity between bequests
and gifts in terms of observability (Arrondel and Masson, 2006); see Lundholm
and Ohlsson (2000) and Bernheim and Severinov (2003).
Here, it is argued that parents have a desire to make equal divisions and that
this also applies for transfers before death. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst
study to explicitly focus on parents￿desire to divide inter vivos transfers equally.
Parents are averse to inequality, we suggest, as for instance Behrman et al. (1982)
have found. However, they are drawn between the ambitions to divide equally and
support the child or the children with greatest needs.
In order to discuss this, we employ a dataset of (non-taxable) inter vivos trans-
fers between generations in Norway. Of particular salience here is that the respon-
dents were asked questions relating to both their children and parents. We can
therefore study the relationship between the respondent and her parents (if they
are still alive) or the respondent and all her (grown-up) children. We use infor-
mation on respondents and their parents, discussing two implications of parents
trading-o⁄"pure altruism" and equal divisions: the degree of income compensation
should be stronger in one-child families since equal division considerations would
not apply in these families, and altruism would dominate the preferences for equal
division when children have income substantially below mean or median income
2levels, generating a non-linear relationship between transfers and recipient income.
Moreover, the respondents were also asked to state their transfer motives, such as
what kind of division rule one should follow if one would like to help the children
economically. These responses are also reported. The data also open up for ad-
dressing within families evidence: we use information about respondents￿children,
comparing siblings belonging to the same family, to determine what child char-
acteristics (relative to the other children of the family) that determines unequal
sharing.
An important argument for addressing inter vivos transfer behaviour in the
present study is that the equal division rule is in fact part of public policies in
Norway. The Norwegian law of transmission limits parents￿possibilities to di⁄er-
entiate between the descendants through bequests, as only one third of the estate
can be transferred according to bequeathers￿preferences. Two thirds of the estate
is reserved for equal sharing between children. The same regulations apply to gifts
that are advancements of inheritance, since they are an integrated part of inheri-
tance tax bases. Also, we expect that the progressive schedule of the Norwegian
inheritance tax contributes to parents levelling out transfers to children. Thus, we
assume that parents who face restrictive transmission rules and a progressive tax
schedule and still want to transfer resources to their children in accordance with
their preferences, will transfer resources in terms of (non-taxable) inter vivos gifts.
In our empirical analyses, we ￿nd that parents pass on more gifts to a child that
have a more di¢ cult situation compared to her/his siblings, which give support
to parents being altruistic. However, we ￿nd that the recipient income derivative
is signi￿cantly higher in one-child families than in multiple child families, and
furthermore, the derivative in multiple child families is non-linear, with a larger
degree of parental compensation among children whose income is lower than mean
or median income. We take this as corroborative evidence for the hypothesis
that parents are faced with a trade-o⁄ between being compensatory and dividing
equally.
These results give support to the view that equal divisions are intentional,
and should not be interpreted as a sign of indi⁄erence from the benefactors side.
Whereas unintended transfers may strenghten the case for taxation of transfers,
because taxes are less distortive with respect to donors￿behaviour when transfers
are not intentional, equal divisions should not be interpreted as promoting the
case for intergenerational transfer taxes. In light of this, one may discuss to what
extent equal divisions can be seen as a feature of altruism, as suggested by Stark
(1998), but that is not an issue here.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we discuss a simple model
of transfer behaviour for parents having preferences both for dividing equally and
being altruistic. The institutional setting for the parents, such as Norwegian trans-
3mission laws and tax regulations, are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the data, whereas results from the di⁄erent approaches to derive information on
altruism and equal divisions are presented in Section 5 and Section 6. First, in
Section 5 we discuss which child characteristics that encourage transfers, given
that are our basic reasoning is founded on altruism, also analysing within family
evidence (grown children belonging to the same family) on characteristics promot-
ing unequal divisions. Thereafter, in Section 6 we explore the parental struggle
between altruism and equal divisions further by discussing two hypotheses: there
is more altruism in one-child families and existence of a non-linear relationship
between transfers and child income. Section 7 presents information on parents￿
self-reported motives for transfers to children, whereas Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Altruism with equal division considerations
Equal divisions might be seen as resulting from precautionary savings under a
life-cycle model; see Davies (1981) for accidental bequests. Taxation of accidental
bequests does not have harmful e⁄ects on donor￿ s behaviour. However, some
studies, such as Stark (1998) and Bernheim and Severinov (2003), argue that equal
divisions are intentional and can be interpreted as following from the behaviour
of altruistic parents. The altruism model (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974; Becker and
Tomes, 1979) has been at the centre of empirical investigations of transfer motives,
see Altonji et al. (1997) and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001). Another alternative is
that parents are motivated by strategic considerations, supporting their children
in exchange of attention and services (Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987).
Here we present a modi￿ed version of the altruism model that incorporates
preferences for equal divisions. A similar model can be found in Lundholm and
Ohlsson (2000). Altruistic parents derive positive utility from own consumption,
cp, and their children￿ s consumption, where ci is the consumption of child i and
n is the number of children, determined by own earnings, ei, and transfers from
parents, bi. Most notably, we open up for parents disliking unequal sharing of
gifts, represented by an inequality aversion supplement. Consumption of parents
and children, respectively, can be seen as





ci = ei + bi; i = 1;:::;n; (2)
4where ep is parental earnings. Assuming log linear parental utility of own con-
sumption and children￿ s consumption, representing inequality by bi=￿ b, where ￿ b = P
i bi=n, and introducing two parameters, measuring the degree of altruism, ￿,
and aversion towards inequality, ￿, we have











Focusing on a parent who makes transfers to the children, in interior solution,
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To illustrate the implications of this model, consider the ￿rst order conditions in






(e1 + b1)(e2 + b2)
b1b2 (b1 + b2)
￿
= e1 ￿ e2 (5)
If there is no equal division attitudes (￿ = 0) then
b2 ￿ b1 = e1 ￿ e2; (6)
This is the standard result of the altruism model. Parents treat their children sym-
metrically, and taking the ei￿ s as given, they balance their gifts and bequests in or-
der to equalise children￿ s consumption, net of transfers. We have that @bi=@ei < 0,
which states that a transfer to child i is decreasing in the child￿ s income. This
derivative together with a second implication of altruism, that transfers increase
with parent￿ s income, @bi=@ep > 0; have been at the core of empirical studies of
altruism. In particular, analyses of the standard model of altruism often focus
on the transfer-income derivative restriction, which states that these two deriva-
tives should add to 1, see e.g., Cox and Rank (1992); Altonji et al. (1997) and
Laitner and Ohlsson (2001). However, empirical analyses ￿nd weak support for
the predictions of the altruism model, as parents often transfer equal amounts to
their children. However, some di⁄erences between bequests and gifts have been
reported: a majority of parents divide their estates equally between children at
death, while inter vivos gift behaviour to a larger extent results from parents￿re-
sponse to characteristics of children (Dunn and Phillips, 1997; McGarry, 1999).
Theoretical contributions to explain this can be found in Lundholm and Ohlsson
5(2000) and Bernheim and Severinov (2003). Lundholm and Ohlsson assume that
the cost of unequal division is only associated with bequests since these are pub-
lic information, and parents who are worried about their post mortem reputation
will use gifts to treat children unequally, as gifts to a larger extent are private in-
formation. Bernheim and Severinov develop equal division norm equilibriums for
bequests from altruism, when an element of parental a⁄ection is added, a⁄ecting
well-being of children and observed through parental transfer behaviour. Within
such an approach gifts may be transferred more unequally, "in secret".
In the present paper we argue that ￿ > 0 and that such motives also apply for
transfers before death. Therefore an important reason for not ￿nding evidence that
con￿rm altruism is that the equalisation is hampered by equal division desires or
aversion to inequality. Parents aversion to inequality is in accordance with results
from Behrman et al. (1982) and is also discussed by Wilhelm (1996); the latter
study refers to unequal divisions of bequests as generating psychic costs. When
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b2 ￿ b1 < e1 ￿ e2; (7)
i.e. parents will compensate less than in the case where they did not have a
negative utility of dividing unequally. The larger the equal division parameter ￿
is, compared to the altruism parameter ￿; the less they compensate income gaps
between children. These results are easily generalised to the case with more than
two children, and they also hold in a more general model.
With respect to the two conjectures discussed in this paper, that the degree of
income compensation should be stronger in one-child families, since these families
are not in￿ uenced by equal division motives, and that the pure altruism motive will
dominate preferences for equal division when income di⁄erences between siblings
are large, we address estimates of the recipient income derivative, @bi=@ei. In the
￿rst case, we compare estimates of @bi=@ei in one-child families with estimates from
larger families. In order to discuss the second conjecture, we discuss non-linearity
of @bi=@ei, arguing that the we will ￿nd more "pure altruism" at low levels of
income, where we ￿nd children with incomes substantially below the income levels
of their siblings.
63 Norwegian gift and bequest laws suggest equal
divisions
As already noted, if transfers to children signal parental a⁄ection, and as gifts
are often less observable than bequests, there are reasons to address information
on inter vivos giving behaviour when discussing altruistic motives. Here we also
note that in the Norwegian case, public regulations limit the scope for altruistic
behaviour. There are at least two sets of laws that impact on transfer behaviour
of Norwegian parents: the transmission law and the inheritance tax law. The law
of transmission between generations regulates the opportunity for compensatory
activities. It states that children (biological or adopted) are guaranteed two thirds
of the estate, for values up till NOK 1 million (approximately US$ 155,000)1 per
person. This appears to be similar to what Arrondel and LaferrŁre (2001) report
as the case in France, and which they characterise as "directive altruism", that
is a legal system that encourages transfers to close relatives. Transmission laws
that are directive with respect to transfer to children exist in a number of other
European countries (Pestieau, 2003).
More important with respect to empirical analyses of altruism in the Norwegian
system, each child is guaranteed an equal share of this mandatory transfer to
children. If a parent leaves NOK 750,000, her two children will receive a mandatory
share of 250,000 each, while the bequeather can freely target the remaining 250,000
according to her objectives in a will: to one of them, to charity, etc.2 Thus,
Norwegian parents are restricted by the law of transmission, making Norwegian
bequest data less useful for deriving information about transfer motives, as testing
the conjectures of the altruism model, since parents may be constrained from
carrying out their true objectives.
We assume that parents under such circumstances will carry out their inten-
tional transfer arrangements through inter vivos gifts. The law states unequiv-
ocally that an equal sharing principle does not exist with respect to inter vivos
transfers that are not advanced bequests. Such inter vivos gifts are also tax ex-
empt. Inter vivos gifts that are considered as advancement of inheritance are both
part of the tax base and limited by transmission laws. At the time of setting up the
empirical approach followed in this study there was no set amount that speci￿ed
when a gift was to be reported to tax authorities, and we chose to consider trans-
fers below NOK 40,000 (approximately US$ 6,200) per year as non-taxable inter
1We use the average exchange rate betwen Norwegian kroner (NOK) and US dollars (US$)
for 2005, 1 US$ = 6.45 NOK, here and throughout the paper.
2Only about 25 percent of donors transfer their assets according to a will (Ministry of Finance,
2000), which indicates that many parents follow the equal division rule also for the "free" part
of the bequest.
7vivos gifts. However, from 2008 this is formalised, the tax authorities stating that
a gift of half of the so-called basic amount from the National Insurance Scheme is
tax exempt. Fortunately, this is very close to our choice of NOK 40,000.
The inheritance tax is progressive and based on aggregated values of taxable
gifts and bequests, see Appendix A where the tax scheme is enumerated. There
are reasons to assume that a progressive inheritance tax also acts as an incentive to
divide bequests equally. In light of these regulations, namely the law of transmis-
sion and the tax law, we believe information from inter vivos transfer behaviour
rather than information on bequests and taxable inter vivos transfers, is relevant
to our discussion of altruism in intergenerational transfers in Norway. These trans-
fers are as such untainted by provisions set out in the law of transmission and the
inheritance tax law.
This paper discusses implications of the struggle between "pure altruism" and
equal divisions, not discussing where the equal division motive comes from; see
Bernheim and Severinov (2003) for equilibrium results of equal divisions. However,
it is worth noting that equal division, at least to some extent, is part of Norwegian
public policy. Parents might also adhere to the equal division rule with respect
to the non-mandatory share as well; the equal sharing rule constituting a transfer
norm introduced by public regulations?
4 Descriptions of data
In order to discuss the degree of altruism in families one should ideally have data
that cover families￿transfer behaviour over a long time period under shifting cir-
cumstances, life-cycle data most preferably. However, here we follow the identi￿-
cation strategy of many other studies by addressing information from cross-section
data (LaferrŁre and Wol⁄, 2006). We exploit very detailed data from a survey con-
ducted by Norwegian Social Research (NOVA) in the winter of 2001. The survey
was intended to be nationally representative and sample selection used two-stage
strati￿ed random sampling. We have initially a sample of 1,900 households.
The survey collected information on the household and its constituent mem-
bers, such as wealth, income, and employment status including attitudes to inter-
generational relations. Both transfers given and transfers received were collected
with a recall period covering the previous 12 months. The survey also collected
information on educational attainment, the economic situation and other charac-
teristics of the interviewed household member￿ s parents and grown children.
For the purpose of our analysis, we use two di⁄erent samples from the survey.
One sample is con￿ned to all respondents with grown children, except students.
We call this the donor sample or donor dataset. Parents are asked about transfers
given in the last 12 months to their children. Since each child-parent pair represents
























































































































a Grown children age 18 or older. The number of respondent parents is 543.
b Grown children with at least one parent still alive
c Parents￿age is respondent￿ s age in the donor data and mother￿ s age in the recipient
data
d In NOK 1,000
e During the last 12 months
9one observation, the number of observations in this sample (1,337) is greater than
the number of parent households (543). We have detailed information about the
parent household, and information on each child as reported by the parent. The
second sample consists of all respondents with at least one living parent. This
is called the recipient sample or the recipient dataset (958 obs.). Grown children
are asked about transfers received in the last 12 months from their parents, when
there is at least one parent alive. In this dataset there is detailed information on
the recipient household, who also report characteristics of the parents. Descriptive
statistics for the two samples are reported in Table 1.3
A gift is de￿ned as any money transfer, payment of regular or extraordinary
expenses, payment of travels/holidays, interest on loans or down payments on
loans, and ￿nancial support through transferring cars/housing or in other ways
allowing the children to make free use of cars/housing. According to Table 1, in
18 percent of the unique parent-child pairs the parents have transferred gifts to
their grown children in the last 12 months.4 The conditional average value of these
transfers is about NOK 31,000 (US$ 4,800). For comparison, the average value of
parent household income is NOK 324,000 (US$ 50,300). The table also shows that
13 percent of the households report that they have received gifts in the last 12
months. The conditional average value of these gifts is NOK 24,000 (US$ 3,720).5
5 Parents show signs of being altruistic
5.1 Determinants of inter vivos gifts
Before entering into closer examination of the trade-o⁄between altruism and equal
divisions (in Section 6), in this section we ￿rst (in Section 5.1) describe deter-
minants of the transfer amount, using the two datasets: donors and recipients.
Moreover, in Section 5.2 we probe deeper into explanations for unequal division
behaviour by addressing information of children belonging to the same family. We
will apply di⁄erent econometric models to identify relationships. However, a gen-
eral speci￿cation of the transfer function following from an altruistic model (see
3Students are omitted from the sample to avoid allowing transfers that can be regarded as
investment in education to a⁄ects results. However, estimates with and without students in data
show little di⁄erence, only smaller standard errors when they are included.
4While 27 percent of the parents have given to at least one of their children.
5We have no information that tells us if a gift has been reported to tax authorities as ad-
vancement of inheritance. In our sample, most of the gift amounts are lower than NOK 40,000
(US$ 6,200), which we previously argued could be an uno¢ cial limit of a gift that would have
to be reported to the tax authorities. We have nonetheless decided to keep all information, and
even gifts higher than NOK 40,000, considering that the tax law at the time of the survey was
unclear about the limit for reporting a gift.
10Section 2) can be seen as
bij = g(ej;ei;X;uij) i = 1;:::;N; j = 1;:::;P;
where bij is the transfer to child i from parent j, ei is the recipient/child income,
ej is the donor/parent income, X is a set of controls describing both donor and
recipient household characteristics that contribute to determine transfer ￿ ows, and
uij is an error term capturing unobserved factors that in￿ uence transfer behaviour.
As is apparent from Table 1, more the majority of the surveyed households
neither gave nor received transfers during the surveyed year. Parents may well
end up with a corner solution with no transfers, which will explain some of the
zero observations. Not observing transfers in data may also be due to the survey
design, which implies that only gifts made or received over the last 12 months
are included. Regardless of the explanation, ignoring the presence of the large
number of zero values will result in the same type of biased inference as produced
by censoring. A Tobit model is employed to account for the presence of non-
participant households when analysing the transferred amount:6
b
￿
ij = ￿1ej + ￿2ei + X￿ + uij; (8)
where ￿1, ￿2 and ￿ are parameters and b￿








In addition, we present results of a standard Probit model estimation,
Pr(bij > 0jX) = ￿(￿1ej + ￿2ei + X￿); (9)
focusing on the determinants of positive transfers, not taking amounts into ac-
counts as in the Tobit model. However, we expect to ￿nd similar results according
to the two speci￿cations.7
We estimate (8) and (9) using both the donor dataset and the recipient dataset.
Since neither dataset has concurrent information about both donor and recipient
income, we run two separate regressions. One shows estimation results based on
6This equation might be misspeci￿ed as it does not address the dependency between children
of the same family; see further on for speci￿cations to alleviate this problem.
7Alternatively, we tried to use a selection model to account for zero transfers. However,
the results showed no evidence of the selection model performing better than the Tobit model
(insigni￿cant inverse Mill￿ s ratio and a correlation between the error terms of the two equations
close to zero). There may be several reasons for this. First, the variables that signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the probability for a positive gift transfer being non-zero have the same sign as in a simple least-
squares regression on conditional gift amounts. Furthermore, theoretically there are no variables
that we expect would only determine the choice to give and not the amount, and vice versa.
11information reported by the parents, where we have full information about the
parents￿income but only proxies for the child￿ s income, such as educational level
and whether the child is unemployed or a student. In the corresponding second
regression we use information provided by the child, where we have full information
about the child￿ s income but only proxy information about the parents￿income.
For the parents, educational level of both parents and age has proved to be the
best available proxies.
In the donor dataset there are N number of children and P (< N) number of
parents, which means that some children (siblings) link up with the same parents.
Thus, in the Tobit and Probit regressions, we adjust standard errors by assuming
clustering by family. However, this feature opens up for a ￿xed e⁄ects approach,
which controls for variables that are common to all siblings in a family. Consider
the following equation for a transfer to child k in family j
bkj = ￿Ykj + vj + "kj; (10)
where k = 1;:::;5 and j = 1;:::;543. In (10) the elements of the vector Ykj are
observed characteristics of the child that may vary between siblings. We include
two unobserved components; one which is allowed to vary across parents and child
("kj) and one unobserved family e⁄ect (vj). By adding ￿xed e⁄ects for each family,
we are able to control for unobserved variables that are common to all siblings.
The constant parental and family factors drop out of the estimated equation, and
the ￿xed e⁄ects model is estimated by regressing the di⁄erences in sibling transfers
on the di⁄erences in their indicator variables on economic situation.
Tables 2 and 3 reports Tobit and Probit estimates for inter vivos gifts given
(donor dataset) and inter vivos gifts received (recipient dataset), respectively. Ta-
ble 2 also reports results of the ￿xed e⁄ects regression.
Addressing the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation results ￿rst (see Table 2), the only
variables that signi￿cantly a⁄ect the size of unequal transfers (at the 5 percent
level) are the child￿ s relative economic situation as evaluated by the parents, and
the child￿ s marital status. Parents pass on more gifts to a child that is worse o⁄
than her siblings, and a child that is single when its siblings are married. Being
single indicates a considerably lower household income. Thus, we see indications
of altruism. The estimates of the Tobit and Probit regressions in Table 2 are
in accordance with this (except that the married/cohabitant variable becomes
insigni￿cant in the Tobit case).
Turning to the results of recipient dataset regressions, Table 3 also shows in-
dications of altruistic behaviour: we see a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect of recipient
income on the amount of inter vivos gifts, and the Probit estimate give support
for a negative relationship. This con￿rms the standard hypothesis that a child
with low income will receive a larger transfer from her parents than a child with
12Table 2: Donor data: determinants of inter vivos gifts
Dependent variable: Tobit Probit Fixed e⁄ects
Gifts given last 12 months Marg.
Coef. S.E.a e⁄ect S.E.a Coef. S.E.
Parent characteristics
Household incomeb .113 .035 .041 .008 ￿ ￿
Household net wealthb .018 .003 .003 .000 ￿ ￿
Age -.820 .697 -.001 .002 ￿ ￿
Couple 10.3 22.7 .062 .052 ￿ ￿
Number of children -33.9 8.13 -.065 .016 ￿ ￿
College/university, father 16.0 13.6 .013 .031 ￿ ￿
College/university, mother 33.3 14.2 .086 .033 ￿ ￿
Child characteristics
Household income ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Female -6.08 10.6 -.024 .022 1.57 2.04
Married/cohabitant -25.7 19.6 -.130 .048 -13.8 4.52
College/university 7.55 11.8 .016 .023 .787 2.61
Grandchildren -1.65 13.1 -.012 .027 -1.55 2.66
Unemployed -.154 21.9 -.026 .042 -4.62 5.07
Economic situation: bad 61.2 21.8 .368 .087 14.4 3.90
Economic situation: well -28.2 11.5 -.042 .024 -3.25 2.63
se 107.7 6.45
E Pr[bij > 0] .15
Log likelihood -1,243 -443
PseudoR2/Within R2 0.05 0.18 0.44
Number of obs. (no of fam) 1,337 1,337 1,337 (543)
a Standard errors corrected for clustering by family
b In NOK 1,000
13Table 3: Recipient data: determinants of inter vivos gifts
Dependent variable: Tobit Probit
Gifts received last 12 months Marg.
Coef. S.E. e⁄ect S.E.
Parent characteristics
Household income ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Household net wealth ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Age -.977 .316 -.003 .001
Couple 4.14 8.37 .009 .022
Number of children -4.38 2.16 -.012 .007
College/university, father 2.72 6.79 .046 .027
College/university, mother 17.9 7.08 .044 .029
Child characteristics
Household incomea -.047 .019 -.017 .007
Female -1.29 4.65 -.009 .022
Married/cohabitant -6.64 5.99 -.027 .021
College/university 11.9 6.31 .061 .023
Grandchildren -7.22 6.59 -.040 .024
Unemployed 2.85 9.31 .028 .036
Economic situation: bad .432 10.1 .031 .040
Economic situation: well -10.5 6.63 -.052 .024
se 55.7 3.91
E Pr[bij > 0] .120
Log likelihood -913 -347
PseudoR2 0.04 0.12
Number of obs. 958 958
a In NOK 1,000
14high income, all other things equal. We replaced the child￿ s household income
with household income per person, without a⁄ecting the results. Further, parents￿
income and wealth have the expected positive sign. However, the size of the coe¢ -
cients is small, the estimate of the recipient income derivative is only around -.05.
The estimates are also small in view of the transfer-income derivative restriction.8
It is not the objective of this analysis to provide estimates for this restriction, as it
(ideally) requires detailed information about parents and children under changing
conditions. However, in order to show magnitudes of the estimates, in Appendix
B we present results in terms of components of the restriction. There we also
apply more sophisticated methods to account for selectivity.9 Note also that this
estimate does not rule out other transfer motives, such as the exchange motive.
A positive estimate for the e⁄ect of parents household income (see Tobit es-
timation in 2) is also in accordance with expectations. E⁄ects of other donor
characteristics are basically the same, irrespective of whether the donor dataset
or the recipient dataset is used. The transfer declines as the parent household
ages, where age is set equal to the mother￿ s age in the recipient data set. It makes
no di⁄erence for the results whether we consider the child￿ s age or the parent￿ s
age. Descriptive statistics show that transfers are smaller and more frequent when
children are younger, and conversely larger and less frequent when parents and
children are older. High education of both mother and father has a positive ef-
fect on the size of a transfer, but note that having a mother with high education
a⁄ects the size and probability of a positive gift more than having a father with
high education, especially in the donor data.
5.2 Within families evidence
As already noted, one of the advantages of the donor dataset is the opportunity
it gives to compare siblings directly. Here, we use this feature to study unequal
treatment behaviour more directly, by conditioning on families where at least one
of the siblings has received an inter vivos gift from his or her parents; in contrast
to the family ￿xed e⁄ects of Table 2, where all families entered into the dataset.
Also, the within family approach followed so far does not open up for unequal
8Recall that a unit￿ s increase in parental income combined with a unit￿ s decrease in child
income should yield a transfer response of one unit (￿1 ￿ ￿2 = 1), as discussed in Section 2.
9Altonji et al. (1997) argue that traditional methods to account for sample selectivity, such
as the Tobit model, can give misleading results when testing the transfer-income derivative
restriction. The reason is that the restriction holds only for bi > 0, and this selection rule
implies that transfers to well-o⁄ children (which occur) will bias against altruism. Moreover, as
altruism is only observed through the transfer-income derivative, and therefore is not separable
from incomes, there is no easy way to control for this selectivity problem. We refer to Appendix
B for estimates when employing the Altonji-Ichimura method (Altonji and Ichimura, 2000) to
control for selectivity.
15Table 4: Distribution of siblings and number of families in the sibling sample
Siblings No of children/ No of parents/ Fraction of families
per family observations families with unequal divisionsa
2 144 72 0.59
3 102 34 0.84
4 24 6 0.83
5 5 1 1.00
Total 275 113 0.72
a Deviation larger than 10 percent from exact equal sharing.
transfers being explained by donor characteristic, whereas it is possible that the
parents￿income, educational level and number of children may be determinants
of the choice to share unequally between children. An alternative approach is
therefore to use the information about parents to control for the number of zeros
in the dependent variable by applying a selection model (Heckman, 1979).10
The Heckman selection model allows us to regress the determinants of unequal
sharing among siblings
bkj ￿￿ bj = ￿(ykj ￿ ￿ yj) + ("kj ￿ ￿ "j);
when the probability of a gift being unequally shared follows from a separate
equation




i.e. the probability of unequal sharing is conditional on a gift being given that
deviate more than 10 percent from exact equal sharing. Zj is a vector of parental
characteristics that is likely to in￿ uence the decision to divide gifts unequally. The
composition of siblings and number of families is presented in Table 4. We see
that there are unequal divisions in many families; the argument of this paper is
that we would have seen more of it, if parents do not have a desire for dividing
equally too.
The results are presented in Table 5. The ￿rst column of the table presents
results for the Probit equation, whereas results of the second stage are presented
10By employing the selection model instead of the Tobit model used in Section 4.3, we allow
the coe¢ cients in the probability equation to have di⁄erent signs from the coe¢ cients in the
OLS equation. Also, to approach the problem by a Tobit model is not meaningful, since the
construction of the dependent variable, di⁄erence in gifts, yields both positive and negative
values.
16Table 5: Results for the probability and determinants of unequal sharing
Probit (1st stage) OLS (2nd stage)a
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Parent characteristics
Household incomeb -.291 .088 ￿ ￿
Couple .884 .375 ￿ ￿
College/university, father .470 .421 ￿ ￿
College/university, mother .035 .397 ￿ ￿
Number of children .961 .278 ￿ ￿
Child characteristics
Economic situation 1.09 .320 -8.06 2.14
Unemployed -.048 .607 6.12 3.20
Age -.016 .020 -.567 .381
Sex -.163 .300 -.039 2.42
Married/cohabitant -.869 .524 3.32 3.20
Educational level -.613 .324 1.82 2.93




No of observations 162
a Dependent/independent variables are measured as deviation
of the child￿ s gift/characteristic from the sibling mean.
b in NOK 1,000
in the second column. The coe¢ cients of the Probit equation show that the prob-
ability of unequal sharing declines signi￿cantly with parents￿household income.
It is reasonable to interpret this as high-income parents more easily avoiding the
trade-o⁄ between compensating one child and treating all their children equally,
by giving equally to all when only one child really needs the gift. Also, if the
parent is single it is more likely that the gift is shared equally among children,
probably since these gifts are intended as advancement of inheritance. The es-
timation also indicates that the probability of unequal sharing increase with the
number of children. This is probably partly due to the limited observation period
of 12 months.
According to the second stage OLS regression, it is only the relative economic
17situation of a child that signi￿cantly a⁄ects how much unequal transfers the child
receives when the probability of unequal sharing is controlled for. The negative
coe¢ cient re￿ ects that the sibling who is better o⁄ receives a smaller transfer.
Thus, again we ￿nd signs of altruism. At a lower signi￿cance level we ￿nd that
older children get less than their younger siblings.
The evidence presented in this section indicate that parents behave in ac-
cordance with altruism: the only consistently signi￿cant determinant of unequal
sharing across speci￿cations is the child￿ s economic situation relative to its sib-
lings. However, even though we ￿nd that parents behave altruistically, we have
also established that e⁄ects are small. We assume that the reason is that parents
also want to divide equally. In the next section we discuss this further.
6 Testing hypotheses about transfer behaviour
under competing motives
6.1 More altruism in one-child families
The regression results of Section 5 forms the background for probing deeper into
explanations for the rather small e⁄ect with respect to equalisation between chil-
dren. In Section 2 we discussed a modi￿cation of the altruism model, under the
assumption that parents with more than one child face a trade-o⁄ between com-
pensating one child￿ s income and giving equally to all children. We would therefore
expect the income compensation to be smaller in families with two or more adult
children than in families with only one child. In this perspective, signs of (pure)
parental altruism, such as the ￿nding evidence in accordance with the transfer-
income derivative restriction, is more realistically obtained in one-child families,
as these parents do not have to struggle with their desires for equal divisions. In
this section we assess to what extent the recipient income derivative, @bi=@ei, is
larger in one-child families.
Table 6 presents results of separate regressions for families with one child and
families with two or more children, employing Tobit estimation and the recipient
data set. The last two columns show that the overall estimate of the recipient
income derivative is -.05. Table 6 shows a big di⁄erence in the estimated transfer
derivative, dependent on number of children: -.32 for one-child families, and only
-.04 for children with siblings. The di⁄erence between the two is signi￿cant at a
5 percent signi￿cance level, con￿rming the hypothesis that an only child receives
more income compensation from her parents, indicating the e⁄ect of preferences for
equal division, competing with "purely" altruistic motives. More altruism in one-
child families is also in accordance with ￿ndings in Wilhelm (1996) with respect
to bequests, but he relates this to a weaker exchange motive in such families.
18Table 6: Estimation results for inter vivos gifts by number of children. Tobit
estimation, recipient dataset
Recipients Recipients
with no with one or
siblings more siblings All
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Parent characteristics
Age .663 .903 -1.02 .237 -.977 .316
Couple -1.10 36.0 3.32 4.98 4.14 8.37
Number of children ￿ ￿ -4.21 1.91 -4.38 2.16
College/university, father -18.5 18.0 5.17 5.67 2.71 6.79
College/university, mother 65.3 22.7 13.7 5.79 17.9 7.08
Child characteristics
Household incomea -.316 .093 -.038 .016 -.047 .019
Female -1.91 18.5 -7.78 4.91 -1.29 4.65
Married/cohabitant 30.8 26.9 -10.9 6.39 -6.64 5.99
College/university 33.9 17.9 10.8 5.20 11.9 6.31
Grandchildren 7.96 21.5 -7.88 5.36 -7.22 6.59
Unemployed ￿ ￿ 4.29 6.74 2.85 9.31
Economic situation: bad -54.1 36.0 4.10 7.51 .432 10.1
Economic situation: well -7.73 27.5 -9.54 5.52 -10.5 6.63
se 32.4 7.45 56.7 2.99 55.7 3.91
Log likelihood -63.1 -842.1 -913
PseudoR2 0.16 0.04 0.04
Number of observations 56 902 958
a In NOK 1,000
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Even though the estimated transfer derivatives for recipient income do di⁄er,
depending on the number of children, it should be noted that the number of
observations is low in the sub-sample of one-child families. Note also that all
other explanatory variables are insigni￿cant in the regression results reported in
the ￿rst two columns, except recipient income and the dummy for mothers with
college/university degree.
6.2 Nonlinearity in the response to child income
As stated above, parents that weigh altruism against equal division considerations
might be involved in unequal gift behaviour when di⁄erences between children
exceed a certain level. In other words, parents will only compensate a child with
an income substantially below the sibling average. Under this hypothesis we will
￿nd more compensating behaviour among recipients at low income levels, because
there we expect to ￿nd children there with much lower income, compared to their
siblings. Letting the expected level of income be represented by mean or median
income, children at low levels of income will presumably both di⁄er substantially
from their siblings and they will be in greater need for assistance.
Graphically we investigate this hypothesis by using a semiparametric regression
method, which has the advantage of not imposing any restrictions on the functional
20form when relating income to gift amounts. The pro￿le in Figure 1 is a ￿tted
spline to the variable recipient household income, whereas the parametric part of
the equation consists of the other variables in the model. According to the ￿gure,
inter vivos gifts seems to be negatively related to household incomes lower than
NOK 500,000 (US$ 77,520), and approximately ￿ at or zero for incomes above that
level. If we compare this to the average income in recipient households, which
is NOK 420,000 (US$ 65,120) in the sample, we ￿nd that a child￿ s income is
negatively related to transfers when the child has lower than average income when
the child has lower than average income.
In light of the plot in Figure 1 the transfer derivative could probably be ap-
proximated by a piecewise linear function, where the transfer derivative is allowed
to change at the lower quartile (NOK 250,000; US$ 38,760) and the upper quartile
(NOK 550,000; US$ 85,270) of the recipient income distribution. Table 7 shows
the results of replacing recipient income with a piecewise linear function de￿ned
as
low income =
ei if ei ￿ 250
250 if ei > 250
medium income =
250 if ei ￿ 250
ei if 250 < ei ￿ 550
550 if ei > 550
high income =
550 if ei ￿ 550
ei if ei > 550
The sample used is child respondents with siblings where explanatory variables
other than income are the same as in Table 6. Table 7 shows that allowing recipient
income to spread out at the low end of the income distribution (as obtained by
the low income spline), generates more equalisation, as indicated by the parameter
estimates: -0.16 for low-income households and zero for high-income households.
Given the size of the standard errors, the estimated coe¢ cients for the three income
segments in Table 7 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other. However,
it yields a strong indication of a non-linear relationship between transfers and
recipient income. Alternatively, we could have chosen median household income
as the knot. The estimated transfers derivatives would then have been -.10 (.02) for
incomes lower than the median and -.02 (.03) for incomes above the median (with
standard errors in parentheses). For incomes above the mean or median income in
the sample, the relationship between gifts and income is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero.
Cox, Hansen and Jimenez (2004) also ￿nd a non-linear relationship when using
data from the Philippines, but they o⁄er a di⁄erent interpretation; arguing that
21Table 7: Tobit results with non-linear transfer response to income
Two or more children
Coef. S.E.
Low household incomeb (<250) -.155 .075
Medium household incomeb (250-550) -.012 .037





Number of observations 902
a Same control variables for parent and child characteristics as in Table 6.
b In NOK 1,000
exchange motives dominate altruism above a threshold level.11 In our interpre-
tation, parents with more than one child face a trade o⁄ between a child￿ s need
and also wanting to divide equally. When the income of a child is above average,
we assume the economic situation of the child is adequate, and parents can give
preference to equal sharing.
7 Reported attitudes
The survey also asked about attitudes towards intergenerational transfers and
motives for transfers, similar to the evidence reported by Light and McGarry
(2004). Since our claim is based on an assumption of parents￿attitude to fairness,
it would be useful to see how they stand on these questions. The question "What
kind of economic obligations do you think parents should have towards their grown
children?" can be related to the degree of altruism since the response alternatives
range from "they should be helped only in emergencies" to "they should be helped
so that they may attain the same living standard as their parents". As shown
in Table 8, a majority of the parents believe children should only be helped in
emergencies. The group of parents actually transferring resources to their children
in the survey period is identi￿ed as "transfer parents" and the table shows that
they are somewhat more inclined to agree about giving children help for purposes
of education, house purchase and starting a family, but the di⁄erence between
those who transfer and the rest is small.
11A non-linear relationship is also noted by other authors, such as Schoeni (1997).
22Table 8: Parents￿attitudes to inter vivos transfers
What kind of economic obligation do you think
parents should have towards their grown children?
All parents Transfer parents
Only in emergencies .68 .64
Education, house and family formation .26 .33
Same living standard as parents .04 .02
When parents that have more than one child give economic support,
how do you think they should divide the resources?
All parents Transfer parents
Equal sharing .73 .67
According to need .23 .29
To the most helpful child .01 .02
To the most able child .00 .01
No of observations 543 147
In the present study we employ information on gifts given in the last 12 months.
As already noted, tests of transfer motives should ideally be carried out with life-
cycle information about transfers from parents to children, also linking siblings to
the parents. The dataset do have information about previous transfers in the form
of questions to the parents about whether they have ever: a) given support to a
child￿ s education, b) helped them buy a house, or c) provided an advance of their
inheritance. Questions like these open up a new set of problems since the answers
depend on the parents￿age (inheritance advances in particular); we therefore use
this information cautiously. We nevertheless note that 50 percent of the parents
had helped their children get an education and 26 percent had helped to buy
a house. Comparing these ￿gures with the 26 percent who believed in helping
children to get an education, there seems to be a discrepancy between theory and
practice.
A related question was: "When parents with more than one child want to
help them economically, how do you think they should divide the money between
them?" Table 8 shows that the majority prefer equality. Very few answer that
they would want the most helpful child or able/talented child to be treated prefer-
entially. Although a sizeable number believes in preferentially helping the child in
most need, equal sharing does seem to be the general norm. The stated preferences
can be checked against the transfer behaviour. Among parents with more than one
child, 45 percent believed they had shared equally between them. Calculations of
23actual behaviour from data show that only about 30 percent approximated equal
sharing (within 10 percent of exactly equal sharing). Again there is a discrepancy
between theory and practice. We conclude that equal sharing, while often the
stated norm, seems di¢ cult to practice when parents face the needs or merits of
the children.
8 Concluding remarks
As discussed for instance by Gale and Slemrod (2000) and Kaplow (2001), an
inheritance tax is expected to distort behaviour when parents are altruistic. If
parents behave in accordance with the altruism model, taxes on intergenerational
transfers are likely to deplete donors￿savings and lower the incentive to work. No
such harmful tax e⁄ects on donors￿behaviour exist if bequests are unintended, that
is, follow from death before donors have been able to consume all their wealth.
In this perspective it is of key importance to interpret parents￿transfer be-
haviour. It is often found that bequests are divided equally, which may support
the view that bequests are unintentional and therefore can be taxed with less dis-
tortive e⁄ects. However, it has been argued that equally divided bequests follow
from psychic costs of unequal treatment (Wilhelm, 1996) or from parental a⁄ection
(Bernheim and Severinov, 2003). Here, the main point has been that parents want
to divide equally, as they are inequality averse, but that this ambition competes
with altruism. Since Norwegian transmission laws and incentives following from
the inheritance tax, limit the scope for ￿nding altruism with respect to bequests
and taxable gifts, we analyse how non-taxable gifts are transferred.
Our results suggest that parents both would like to divide equally and be
altruistic. If parents divide unequally to their children, they will support the child
that they believe has a di¢ cult economic situation. But we also ￿nd support
for parents￿preferences for equal divisions, as the recipient income derivative is
signi￿cantly higher in one-child families than in multiple child families and by
￿nding that the income derivative in multiple child families is non-linear, with
a larger degree of parental compensation of income when the child￿ s income is
lower than mean or median income. Parents￿self-reported motives for transfers to
children also suggest that dividing equally is important.
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27A The Norwegian inheritance tax system
The Norwegian inheritance tax system is based aggregation of gifts (over the yearly
tax-free amount) and bequests to establish the tax base. Spouses are considered
as two donors, which means that the value of an asset that is owned by both
parents (matrimonial asset) is divided into two parts, one for each parent, when
calculating the tax base. As shown in the ￿gure, the inheritance tax rate scheme
implies that inheritances below NOK 250,000 (US$ 39,000) is tax exempt, while a
two-tier rate system applies to inheritances above that, commencing at a rate of
8 percent, while transfers above NOK 550,000 (US$ 85,000) are taxed at a rate of
20 percent. This scheme also applies to parents of the deceased.
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The ￿gure also shows that the rates for other relatives and other heirs under a
will are 10 percent and 30 percent in the two brackets, respectively. Inter-spousal
gifts and bequests are not taxed. The general valuation rule is that assets should
be valued at the market value. However, there are some important exemptions.
For non-listed shares and interests in partnerships, ￿rstly, the value of the company
is calculated by excluding values of most intangible assets, as goodwill, by setting
real estate values very low, and, secondly, only 30 percent of the total value is
included in the tax base. The main purpose of this rule is to facilitate the transfer
of family businesses. However, because of the tax avoiding behaviour such rules
induce, the schedule will most likely be changed in the future, involving rate cuts
in exchange of base broadening. Note also that there are incentives to report low
values, as taxation in most cases is based on values reported by tax-payers to tax
authorities.
28B The AI estimator and the transfer-income deriv-
ative restriction
Based on Altonji and Ichimura (2000), relying on the assumption that the dis-
tribution of altruism is independent of incomes and other explanatory variables,

























￿ b(Z) = E [b(Z)jZ;b > 0]; and Pb = P [b > 0jZ]:
Z denotes explanatory variables corresponding to X in equation (8). However, in
order to make the function more ￿ exible we introduce a third degree polynomial
in income and age. It should be noted that we ￿nd some variations in estimates
dependent on which variables that enter into the polynoms. When using this
estimation strategy, the corresponding estimates for the parents￿income derivative,
^ ￿1, is 0.18 and the child￿ s income derivative, ^ ￿2, is -0.044, which gives an estimate
of the transfer-income derivative restriction of 0.22.
There are several factors that may potentially account for this small estimate.
In the present paper, we focus on preferences for equal divisions. There may be
other explanations, for instance, parents may be uncertain about their own future
income, in particular if they have not yet reached retirement. Parents may also
be uncertain about their children￿ s future income, and use current income as a
signal of future income. McGarry (2000) suggests that transfers from altruistic
parents will not react much to a drop in current income, since a drop in current
income leads parents to modify the expected future income of the child, and thus
anticipate a need for higher transfers in the future.
Asymmetric information may also contribute to small estimates. According to
Villanueva (2002) parents may observe the income of their children, but observe
neither the labor market opportunities nor the e⁄ort of their children. In this
setting, parents face a trade-o⁄ when deciding about the optimal amount of help
to give to their children. For analysis of detrimental e⁄ects of transfers, see also
discussions of the Samaritan￿ s dilemma, as in Bruce and Waldman (1990).
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